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1. Introduction  
 
One of black swan events happened on 2016 is that the United King voted to exit 
the European Union. A total of 33.5 million British turned out to polling stations on 23 
June 2016. Voter turnout exceeded 72%.The end result was unexpected and relatively 
tight: Brexit won with 52% of the vote.  
 
According to the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which is referred to as the 
"simplified EU Constitutional Treaty", after the UK has notified the EU of its official exit 
from the European Union, it will be given up to two years and EU member states will 
conduct a various negotiations. As a result, Britain will remain in the EU for the 
foreseeable future. While here are a lot of negotiations to discuss the future path. 
 
If the UK were to decide to leave the European Union, many aspects of political 
and economic life would be affected. One of those would be the UK’s public finances. 
This would happen in a direct way. UK currently a net contributor to the EU budget and, 
in that respect, leaving the EU would strengthen UK public finances. The amount they 
currently contribute, and could potentially save, is arithmetically quite straightforward to 
calculate. But public finances depend crucially on the strength of the overall economy, 
and if the economy were to be stronger or weaker outside the EU than within it then this 
effect would be likely to overwhelm the direct effect.  
 
In this paper, I consider both the possible direct and indirect consequences of a 
Brexit for the UK’s public finances and the fiscal performance. My objective of this 
thesis is to provide the analysis of Brexit consequences with the main focus on evaluating 
the effects on UK public finance. 
 
In Chapter 2, I look at the direct effects for the different aspects like economic, 
movement of people, investment from outside and the budget contribution to EU. Those 
fours factors are not only mainly factors for UK's future development but also will 
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influence the EU even whole world economic reaction.  
 
About Chapter 3, I looks at the now considerable literature and results from 
modelling the possible economic consequences of leaving the EU. So I list some choices 
also the possible scenarios which are post- Brexit main originations play an important 
role in international business and UK's probably decisions. Were they to leave the EU and 
not join the European Economic Area (EEA) or similar arrangement, these effects are 
fairly clear. But there remains the possibility that in a post-Brexit world, the UK would 
sign up to all or some of the responsibilities that would go with joining the EEA or any 
other optional organizations as I mentioned in chapter 3, so I also look at what effects that 
might have and make the comparison about the different unions. 
 
 It sets out the scale of trade with the EU and other partners and the role of tariffs, 
and other non-tariff barriers and looks at the different options in terms of trade 
agreements following a leave vote. It then looks at both the short- and long-term possible 
economic effects of leaving the EU, drawing on the various studies and explaining the 
possible roles of uncertainty, trade, foreign direct investment, regulation and immigration.  
 
Chapter 4 goes on to say the negotiations between the UK and the EU are now 
well under way. However, the UK and EU remain miles apart on a number of issues and 
the UK or EU relationship being based on WTO rules, even for an interim period, looks 
like an increasingly realistic prospect. Meanwhile I use the analysis in the one previous 
chapters to look at possible public finance impacts in the short and long runs. To see how 
much impact they make and how many years the impact they will cause. Because there 
are no quantified economic scenarios from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) or 
the Bank of England, I use some of the most credible independent economic forecasts to 
look at these possible public finance outcomes from like PwC and Morgan Stanley etc. 
The market's focus on Brexit is mainly in the short term; but from a long-term 
perspective, the European Union, the European relations, the world economy, global 
financial markets and the future development prospect of EU's economic and financial 




Chapter 5 is the conclusion for this Brexit decision and my personal opinion that I 
figure out for the majority of businesses in Britain the possibility the UK might leave the 
European Union –Brexit –is a major source of concern. Both the break with the EU and 
the uncertainty associated with it would be bad for business and damaging to the UK 
economy. A great deal has now been written on the economic consequences for the UK of 
Brexit. Some of this is impartial; much of it is partisan. Very little has been written on the 
consequences for the rest of the EU. At the heart of this paper are the analysis and the 
different channels of impact. For each I consider in turn the impact on the UK and on the 
rest of the EU. I also mentioned a little influence in which different member states are 
exposed through these channels. 
 
I conclude that while the biggest impact of Brexit would be on the UK about 
fascial performance, there can be little doubt that there will also be a significant impact 
on the rest of the EU. 
 
Finally, by way of introduction, it is important to stress that I am here looking at 
more only one aspect of the Brexit debate that is the economics public finances and fiscal 
measures matter, but they are by no means the only things that matter. I hope that what I 
have here will even help  a little bit inform that particular element of the debate for others 
to weigh up alongside all the other issues that will count in coming to a decision over UK 













2. Brexit and its Causes 
 
If the UK were to leave the EU, the direct impact on lots of aspects of economic 
and political. For example, this would give rise to a reduction in UK public spending, 
although replacing at least some of the spending that is currently undertaken by the EU in 
the UK would presumably offset some of this fall. Furthermore, some form of 
contribution to the EU budget might be required if the UK wanted continued access to the 
EU’s single market, particularly in services, which would further offset budgetary 
savings. This chapter looks at the potential and general size of this direct impact on the 
good and service, foreign investment, movement of people and budget, sets it in the 
context of overall UK government spending and borrowing. (The deep impact on the 
economic especial public finances of the UK leaving the EU – that is, taking into account 
any change in national income – both in the short and long runs, is considered in Chapter 
4.) 
2.1. Trade in goods and services in EU. 
 
As we all know, the Brexit behavior must influence the changes of all factors like 
trades about goods and services. 
 
First, Brexit happened, the UK economy may fall into recession. Lagarde, 
chairman of the International Monetary Fund, said on May 13, 2016 that Brexit would be 
a "terrible" option to the British economy. The organization wrote in a June 17th report 
that if Britain chooses to leave the EU, the impact on the UK economic outlook will be 
negative and huge. Even it is a post report, and it still expressed some information about 
the world's voice. In extreme cases, the UK's economic growth in 2019 may slow 1.5% -
5.5% relative to that of the EU. 
 
Meanwhile, Brexit would have a negative impact on trade between Britain and 
Europe. The EU is Britain's largest and most important export destination, accounting for 
46.9% of the total UK exports, with the United States and China accounting for only 
11.9% and 5.1%. At the same time, the EU is also the UK's largest importer of the 
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economy, accounting for 52.3% of the total UK imports. The Brexit and the many 
agreements, rules and legal basis on which the British economy operates will be broken, 
the country's economy must undergo violent shocks. For example, the United Kingdom 
will need to secure access to a single European market, reopen EU trade agreement 
negotiations with 60 other countries and regions, and rewrite thousands of EU regulations 
in English law. Moody's rating agency believed that the departure from the EU will have 
a negative impact on the British economy in the short to medium term. The medium-term 
economic impact depends mainly on the new trade agreement Britain can negotiate with 
the EU. In addition, Britain's post-Brexit trade policy will be less pronounced. The EU is 
currently conducting TTIP talks with the United States and Japan, and it is hard for the 
United Kingdom to participate directly. 
 
My article takes a close look at recent trends, focusing on total intra-EU trade in 
goods and the most traded products. It presents statistics for the EU-28 aggregate and for 
individual Member States for the period covering 2002 to 2013, although the composition 
of the actual EU has changed over this period. 
 
Statistics on international trade in goods between Member States of the European 
Union especially the size and evolution of imports and exports, enable the EU and 
national authorities to evaluate the growth of the Single Market and the integration of EU 
economies. These statistics also provide EU businesses with essential information for 
their sales and marketing policies. 
 
Figure 1 shows the seasonally adjusted value of monthly total exports of goods 
for EU-28 Member States to other Member States. In 2002 (1,908 billion EUR) and 2003 
(1,927 billion EUR) the level of exports of goods was fairly stable, followed by a period 
of rapid increase between 2004 and the third quarter of 2008. From the fourth quarter of 
2008 to the end of the second quarter of 2009 there was a sharp decrease in the value of 
exports of goods. Following this decline the value of exports of goods began to increase 
again until the beginning of 2011, when it had returned to the level seen before the 
decrease at the end of 2008. From 2011 onwards the level has been relatively stable and 
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the annual value for 2015 is over EUR 3,063 billion. 
 
（data from January 2017. Most recent data: Further Eurostat information, Main tables and Database.） 
 Figure 1  
 
Since the introduction of the Intrastat data collection system for intra-EU trade in 
goods on 1 January 1993, the value of intra-EU exports of goods has been consistently 
higher than that of intra-EU imports of goods. In theory, as intra-EU exports of goods are 
declared FOB-type value and intra-EU imports of goods CIF-type value, the value of 
intra-EU imports of goods should be slightly higher than that of intra-EU exports of 
goods. The analysis presented in this article considers intra-EU exports of goods only, as 
it is the more reliable measure of total intra-EU trade in goods since, at aggregated levels, 
total intra-EU exports of goods has better coverage than total intra-EU imports of goods. 
 
Here is a wide variation in the value of export trade in goods by Member State 







In 2015 the value of export trade in goods within the EU ranged from over EUR 6 
billion for UK to other Member States in the EU. There were nine Member States 
(Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and 
the United Kingdom) whose exports of goods to partners in the EU were over EUR 100 
billion in 2015, accounting for almost 80 % of the total value of intra-EU exports of 
goods. 
 
 2003 2009 2015 Annual 
average growth 
rate (%) 
Belgium 51 65 101 6 
Bulgaria 2 4 8 11 
Czech Republic 5 12 14 13 
Denmark 17 22 33 6 
Germany 231 300 505 7 
Estonia 1 2 3 12 
Ireland 31 32 52 4 
Greece 4 7 12 9 
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Spain 34 49 89 8 
France 115 130 188 4 
Croatia 2 3 4 7 
Italy 1 2 2 6 
Cyprus 6 12 17 14 
Latvia 1 1 1 17 
Lithuania 2 4 9 12 
Lu 1 2 2 6 
Hungary 6 12 17 9 
Malta 1 1 1 2 
Netherlands 51 80 125 8 
Austria 20 27 41 6 
Poland 8 20 37 13 
Portugal 5 8 14 8 
Romania 4 7 14 12 
Slovenia 3 4 7 9 
Slovakia 3 6 10 12 
Finland 19 20 22 1 
Sweden 37 39 52 3 




Table 1 shows that for 12 Member States the value of exports of goods to partners 
in the EU-28 has increased more than 100 % between 2003 and 2015 and another five 
where the growth was between 50 % and 100 %. The UK had a huge increasing in 2015 
one year before decided Brexit.  
 
Sometimes it can be difficult to interpret figures in absolute terms for individual 
member States. In particular their trade in goods balances must be interpreted with 
caution for the phenomenon of Quasi-transit. So I use the figure 3 to explain the balance 
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of import and export. 
 
Source: Eurostat DS-018995 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 3 shows that, as with the size of the exports flows for trade in goods, there 
was also a wide variation between Member States in the balance of these two flows. 
Sixteen Member States have negative trade in goods balances, i.e. they import more 
goods by value from EU partners than they export to other EU Member States. There 
were both larger and smaller economies within the EU with negative trade in goods 
balances in 2015. The largest negative intra-EU trade in goods balances were recorded 
for the UK (119 billion) and France (84 billion). So now I could suppose the biggest 








Table 2 shows the trade in goods balance for 2003, 2009 and 2015. Over this 
period, most Member States have continued to be either net importers of goods (for 
example France and the United Kingdom) or net exporters of goods (for example 
Germany and Czech Republic). However the extent of the positive or negative balance 
has changed for many Member States. For example  
 
UK continues to be a net importer of goods from other Member States, but the 
negative goods balance has increased from EUR 40 billion to EUR 118 billion. At the 
same time, Germany continues to be a net exporter of goods but its positive balance has 
decreased from EUR 79 billion to under EUR 72 billion. The data shows the UK is 
always the big a net importer of goods from other Member States. The situation may have 
a huge changes after Brexit finished. 
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2.2. Foreign direct investment in UK  
 
The UK is considered one of the best countries to start all kinds of business, but 
that could change due to the unknown effects from Brexit. One of the changes is the 
possible reduction of foreign investment. 
 
The fact is half of the UK’s FDI stock accounting for £1 trillion, comes from the 
rest of European Union. After Brexit decided, higher trade costs and tariffs would likely 
decrease investments in the UK.  
 
According to OECD official analysis, leaving the EU would have a negative 
impact on FDI inflows in the UK and is likely to decrease by 22%. The UK being a part 
of the single market has attracted many foreign investors as they have not had to face 
high cost barriers from tariffs and could easily export to other EU countries. Growth in 
the value of foreign direct investment (FDI) positions held in the UK by overseas 
investors (FDI liabilities) exceeded that of UK FDI positions held abroad (FDI assets) in 
2016, resulting in the UK’s net FDI position falling from £50.8 billion in 2015 to £12.5 
billion by 2016, the lowest net position since comparable records began in 1997. 
 
While the truth may cause some different situation, according to 2017 World 
Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the United Kingdom was the second largest recipient of FDI in the world in 
2016 after being ranked 12th a year before. This drastic increase was largely due to the 
acquisition of the British SABMiller PLC by Anheuser-Busch Inbev (Belgium) for USD 
101 billion. Consequently, the country received an all-time high FDI influx of USD 253 
billion in 2016 (compared to USD 33 billion in 2015). Despite Brexit, the UK economy 
still has some key strengths: London remains the financial capital of Europe, while Great 
Britain still has a strong currency, despite its recent devaluation, and is one of the most 
important European markets. The UK placed seventh of 190 economies in the 2017 




The largest share of FDI inflow into the UK goes to the financial services 
industry, and half of the UK's current investment stock of GBP 1 trillion comes from the 
EU member States. The Brexit vote raises concerns among certain investors about higher 
trade costs with Europe. 
  
Foreign Direct Investment 2014 2015 2016 
FDI Inward Flow (million 
USD) 
44,821 33,003 253,826 
FDI Stock (million USD) 1,628,581 1,408,276 1,196,520 
Number of Greenfield 
Investments*** 
1,188 1,332 1,175 
FDI Inwards (in % of 
GFCF****) 
9.0 6.8 57.9 
FDI Stock (in % of GDP) 54.2 49.2 45.5 
Source: UNCTAD, Latest available data. 
Table 3 
This may not be the case which the UK leave the EU and the single market 
agreement. The uncertainty of future trade relations between the UK and the EU can also 
dampen FDI into the UK. 
 
2.3. Movement of people in UK 
 
It is obvious that the Brexit will impact on employment and labor market due to 
the policies changes and the more complexed visa procedures and different employment 
benefits policies and tax laws related. 
 
Ever since the UK voted to leave the EU, the number of migrants looking for jobs 
outside the UK have spiked up, says Indeed, a leading job site. According to statistics, the 
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UK’s unemployment rate is likely to increase to 6.5% due to recession, which is a loss 
equivalent to 500,000 jobs. 
 
The latest figures say that there are currently 2.1 million European immigrants 
working in the UK. In industries such as engineering, IT, and construction, where there 
are shortages of skilled workers in the UK, immigrants from the European Union are 
filling the void by bringing in vital skills. They are also a major contributor to the 
unskilled labor market. 
 
EU immigrants also contribute substantially to the healthcare sector in terms of 
employment. If these EU workers leave the UK, there will be a huge gap between the 
demand for skilled workers and supply. Thus, the UK’s ability to recruit international 
talent could be at stake. 
 
As the same situation that when the Greek government held a referendum on the 
terms of its bailout agreement in 2015, Indeed saw a spike in Greek job-seekers searching 
for work elsewhere in the EU. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, the same Indeed 
institution saw a similar pattern. 
 
In fact, Indeed data (figure 4) shows that in the 48 hours following the 
announcement of the results, the share of UK jobseekers looking for opportunities in 
European countries was double the average in the days prior to the vote. As for what they 
were looking for, top searches included roles in marketing, human resources, hospitality 
and the finance sectors. 
 
With millions of citizens of other EU countries currently based in the UK—many 
of whom had expressed concern about their future in the run-up to the referendum—this 
surge in EU-oriented job search could be a reflection of that anxiety. Facing an uncertain 
future in the UK, it is likely that many EU citizens might be inclined to look at 




Source: indeed. Data 
Figure 4 
2.4. UK budget contributions to EU 
 
The effect of Brexit are half negative and half positive. The benefits of Brexit to 
UK businesses is that free from contributing to the common budget. The financial 
relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU) continues to be a major 
talking point as the terms of Brexit are negotiated. 
 
The EU budget has three main sources. First one is the "membership dues" paid 
by member states in proportion to their gross national income, accounting for more than 
70% of the total EU budget revenue. Second, VAT; third, tariffs imposed from outside the 
EU. The budget is mainly used for agriculture, poverty-stricken areas, UNESCO, foreign 
aid and administrative expenses of EU institutions. To ensure food security in Europe and 
to ease the polarization within the EU, the EU spends most of its budget on common 
agricultural policies and solidarity funds that support poor areas. The UK’s contribution 
to the EU budget changes each year as it is dependent on various factors such as: UK 
gross national income (GNI), the GNI of other EU member states and the value of the 
UK rebate (which is not a fixed amount, rather it is based on payments and receipts for 
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the previous year). 
Here, using ONS figures I take a look at how the UK contribution has changed 




Source: Pink Book ONS 
Figure 5 
 
According to a 2015 analysis, the UK contributed £13 billion to the European 
Union budget. The net contribution amounted to around £8.5 billion each year. In 2016, 
the government spent £814.6 billion on all aspects of public spending, but actually it is 
not the new value about how much the UK pay to the EU as a current member. 
 
The rebate the UK gets, called the Fontainebleau Abatement, and the net impact 





I take a look at the numbers, using latest data from the ONS that account for the 
UK’s official transactions with EU institution, as well as data from the European 
Commission. In 2016, the UK’s gross contribution to the EU amounted to £18.9 billion. 
However, this amount of money was never actually transferred to the EU.  
 
Also in 2016, the UK received a rebate of £5 billion. This means £13.9 billion 
was transferred from the UK government to the EU in official payments. 
 
The simple math equation is that: 
Total amount £18.9= contribution after rebate £13.9+ rebate £5.0. 
But this only accounts for the money that the UK pays to the EU – some of this 
£13.9 billion is credited back to the UK public sector, of which a proportion is then paid 
to the private sector. 
 
ONS reports that £4.4 billion came back to the UK public sector and private 
sector in credits in 2016. This included £359 million that came back through 
the European Regional Development Fund and £2.4 billion through the Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund. Given these figures, ONS reports that the UK government’s net 
contribution to the EU – that is the difference between the money it paid to the EU and 








Even the real contribution is kind of rough less than the real one, however, the 
decision to leave the EU can still save the UK government a lot from having to contribute 
every year. Different studies show different contribution figures. The chart above shows 
the predictions of the UK’s contribution to the EU in the coming few years from OBR the 

















3. Possible Scenarios for Post-Brexit UK Economy 
 
The impact of Brexit on the UK’s economy will depend largely on how it affects 
the state of the economy, rather than on the some scenarios identified in Chapter 2. 
 
This chapter reviews the post Brexit economy and sets out different area's and 
organization's rules, looks at the UK’s economic relationship with other different 
agreements and the alternative policy options and also identifies and assesses the main 
economic issues through some models (Section 3.3). The EU's response section identifies 
the EU's attitude due to the huge and long economic impact also that feed into the next 
chapter, which presents the economy changes mainly about public finance implications. 
3.1. European Economic Area (EEA)  
 
The European Economic Area (EEA) is the area in which the agreement on the 
EEA provides for the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital within 
the European Single Market, including the freedom to choose residence in any country 
within this area. The EEA was established on 1 January 1994 upon entry into force of the 
EEA Agreement.  
 
The EEA Agreement specifies that membership is open to member states of either 
the European Union (EU) or European Free Trade Association (EFTA). EFTA states 
which are party to the EEA agreement participate in the EU's internal market without 
being members of the EU. They adopt most EU legislation concerning the single market, 
however with notable exclusions including laws regarding agriculture and fisheries. The 
EEA's "decision-shaping" processes enable EEA EFTA member states to influence and 
contribute to new EEA policy and legislation from an early stage. Third country goods 
are excluded for these states on rules of origin. After Brexit the UK could seek to 
continue to be a member the European Economic Area (EEA) as a member of EFTA. 
Theresa May, the British Prime Minister has said that the UK government would not seek 




So the current situation which is Britain is currently a member of the European 
Economic Area as a member of the European Union. Questions have been raised as to 
whether a state that withdraws from the EU automatically withdraws from the EEA or 
whether such a withdrawal requires notice under Article 127 of the EEA Agreement– and, 
if the courts so decide, whether such notice given by the UK would require an act of 
parliament.  
 
According to the economic situation epically the changes of trade for UK and the 
financial service industry, if Britain still stays in EEA, the financial sector would continue 
to have the right to carry out business in all EU countries, but there would be no say in 
the planning of EU rules. 
 
If the UK does not join the EEA, the UK companies that want to operate in the 
EU will have an "equivalent" test to prove that the system is as strict as the EU. 
 
British companies that want to provide financial services to individual EU retail 
investors may need to set up a subsidiary to operate the same business in order to pass the 
test in the EU, which would cost more than running a branch. 
 
A data shows the size of 5.5 trillion pounds ($7.9 trillion) most of the mutual fund 
industry, is almost entirely in accordance with the EU set negotiable Securities 
Investment plan (UCITS/Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities) the provisions of the operation. Professional lawyers think the fund industry 
could lose its status as the UCITS, regarded as the global gold standard, causing serious 
disruption to the business unless the UK joined the EEA. In the point of economic and 
political, it is advantages outweigh disadvantage. EEA is one of the good choices for UK 
later in the world as an independent country to join any free union and organization. 
 
3.2. World Trade Organization (WTO)  
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international 
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organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO 
agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified 
in their parliaments. The goal of WTO is to help producers of goods and services, 
exporters, and importers conduct their business. For now, Britain and the EU have 
formally informed members of the WTO how they plan to split up the EU’s tariff quotas 
and farm subsidies after Brexit. While actually the plan already rejected by the White 
House. 
 
Under WTO rules, country-specific quotas permit low-tariff imports, such as 
butter and meat, up to a certain volume, after which higher tariffs can be applied. The 
joint plan suggests the EU’s existing agricultural quota commitments will be 
“apportioned” based on historical trade flows, and the current ceilings on support for 
farmers will be maintained. 
 
For future development about UK and considering of the profit of all WTO 
members, UK could take more responsibility in order to get a smooth transition. 
 
Meanwhile, in the point of fiscal performance, UK need to pay attention to the 
tariff question when it is not a member of EU. Britain is also a member of the WTO. As 
one of the sponsors of the tariff agreement, Britain automatically enjoys the benefits of 
the WTO's no-discrimination commitment. 
 
And once Britain's EU membership ends, British manufacturers will face the 
same tariffs as the rest of the world. Decades of multilateral negotiations have put the 
WTO tariffs down. Leaving the EU but also being a member of the WTO, Britain is free 
to impose tariffs on other countries. After Brexit, it is likely that the UK will keep tariffs 
as much as the EU. The UK would not be able to set tariffs for imports at a higher level 
than the EU. The reason for this is that many tariffs in the WTO agreements are “bound” 
at maximum levels and the vast majority of the EU’s applied tariffs are set at the bound 
tariff rates. Meanwhile British consumers are also likely to continue to enjoy years of low 
prices. It remains likely that the UK and the EU will be able to agree a zero-tariff 
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arrangement. However, even if a zero-tariff FTA is agreed, the position will be very 
different compared to the current position as a member of the single market and customs 
union. If the UK leaves the customs union, it will no longer be bound by the EU’s 
common external tariff and will be free to set its own MFN tariffs on imports into the 
UK. While the Department for International Trade has said that the UK will adopt the EU 
MFN tariffs, the UK could choose to reduce its import tariffs below EU levels, provided 
it continues to observe the MFN principle that MFN tariff rates differ significantly and 
higher tariffs are generally applied in relation to products that are produced in the EU. 
 
At the same time, the Institute for Fiscal Studies and others have pointed out that 
if leaving the EU implies slower growth, the net saving would be wiped out through 
lower tax revenues and higher benefit spending. So in this case, Britain is not forced to 
keep a low tariff as fiscal measure. While the UK still needs to set a baseline for the 
negotiation for any future in fiscal way. 
 
As I mentioned about WTO, the one of UK's choice about agreement with others 
counties is MFN. In international economic relations and international politics, "most 
favored nation" (MFN) is a status or level of treatment accorded by one state to another 
in international trade. The term means the country which is the recipient of this treatment 
must nominally receive equal trade advantages as the "most favored nation" by the 
country granting such treatment. (Trade advantages include low tariffs or high import 
quotas.) In effect, a country that has been accorded MFN status may not be treated less 
advantageously than any other country with MFN status by the promising country. There 
is a debate in legal circles whether MFN clauses in bilateral investment treaties include 
only substantive rules or also procedural protections. 
 
The members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agree to accord MFN 
status to trade each other. Exceptions allow for preferential treatment of developing 
countries, regional free trade areas and customs unions. Together with the principle of 
national treatment, MFN is one of the cornerstones of WTO trade law. So as a member of 
WTO, UK's policy orientation could make such as Britain and the European Union 
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between most-favored-nation (MFN) to establish the WTO rule after fully Brexit. 
According to the OECD's prediction and calculation, the UK's total exports will still be 
8.1% less than they are now, reduced by 5.8%, exports to the EU imports from the 
European Union to reduce 9.4%, it may be a short term trade reducing. But it is worth to 
consider about it as a valuable agreement for those MFN benefits. 
 
 
3.3. Various preferential models  
3.3.1. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)  
 
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) are three free trade 
areas established between the European Union, and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
respectively. The DCFTAs are part of each country's EU Association Agreement. They 
allow Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine access to the European Single Market in selected 
sectors and grant EU investors in those sectors the same regulatory environment in the 
associated country as in the EU. 
 
The new Association Agreements that came into force in 2016 with Ukraine, 
Georgia and Moldova are characterized by their comprehensive political and economic 
content, and inclusion of DCFTAs, which could lead to a high degree of inclusion in the 
single market for three of the four freedoms (free movement of goods, service and 
capital, but not people). The exclusion of free movement of people is because of concern 
in the EU over the prospect of large flows of immigrants. The EU’s doctrine that all four 
freedoms are an indivisible package is thus applied to the EU itself and the EEA, but not 
between the EU and other close neighbors, or FTAs with the rest of the world. These 
Agreements set out in legally precise terms the entire agenda for defining the relationship 
with the EU, sector by sector, for virtually all EU competences. The structure of chapters 
is more or less the same as that used in many of the EU’s other association or partnership 
agreements with third countries, but the key issue is how far these chapters entail legally 




The DCFTAs entail a high degree of compliance with EU acquis, and thus are a 
category apart from the most advanced agreements with non-European countries such as 
the CETA with Canada. The DCFTA is asymmetric in privileging EU law, whereas the 
CETA is strictly symmetric with reference to each party’s laws. As a result the DCFTA, 
when fully implemented after transitional arrangements (that would in any case be 
irrelevant in the UK context), can assure a very high degree of access to the EU single 
market, close to the EEA case at least for trade in goods, but not for the movement of 
people or services. The coverage of EU law is very extensive (see Annex 3), but not quite 
as complete as for the EEA. For some service sectors the DCFTA offers the possibility of 
‘full internal market treatment’, conditional on full compliance with the EU acquis, 
notably for financial services and telecommunications. The dispute settlement 
mechanisms lean on WTO practice, with less total reliance on the European Court of 
Justice than in the EEA case. There is no general contribution to the EU budget by the 
partner state, except for participation in specific agencies and programmers.  
 
On the contrary, the EU is making substantial grant and loan aid to its DCFTA 
partners, whereas for the UK the EU is expected to request a general budget contribution 
as condition for preferential market access. The Association Agreement also includes 
several other chapters that would be of great importance for the UK, including 
participation in the Horizon 2020 program for scientific research, the "Erasmus+" 
program for cooperation in higher education and universities, the European Defense 
Agency, Europol, etc.  
 
Furthermore, the wide extent to which the EU would want to offer a deal designed 
for states keen on integration, to a state on course to leave, remains to be seen. Although 
the existing DCFTAs were fashioned for countries set on integration, rather than exiting 
the bloc, it remains to be seen whether the agreements emerge as a framework for 
Britain’s own relationship after Brexit. In this preferential agreement, contribution of free 
trade market is based on UK's aid budget for the DCEFTA to cover a part fee. UK would 
focus on customer border and the trade defenses as a part of EU or as an independent 
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country probability like Swiss. Meanwhile, both CETA and the DCFTA provide for tariff-
free trade in both industrial and agricultural products, with few and very limited 
exception. I think the benefit is still working for UK for sure. 
 
3.3.2.  Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
 
These are agreements between the EU and the non-member Balkan states that 
have ‘membership perspectives’, including Bosnia, Serbia, Albania, and Macedonia. 
They provide for a gradual move to tariff-free trade, alongside much attention given to 
the much needed improvement in the rule of law. Compared to the DCFTA, while the 
SAA model is also extensive in its listing of topics, the legal precision and level of 
binding commitment in the internal market area is much less. For example the Serbian 
SAA seeks to “promote the use of EU technical standards and regulations”, which is a 
weak formulation of uncertain operational meaning.  
 
An Assessment of the Economic Impact of Brexit on the EU27 countries are dealt 
with by reference to WTO or other international standards. Several key service sector 
chapters, such as for financial services and telecommunications, are dealt with only at the 
level of vague endeavors to “cooperate”. The SAA model is also not politically relevant 
for the UK because it is intended to be a stepping-stone towards full membership. In this 
case, once any country is not a member of EU again, the benefit of SAA is gone, then the 
UK needs to reconsider the trade with previously SAA benefited countries, even it is not 
a huge influence for UK. 
  
3.3.3.  Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA)  
 
The EU has many PCAs, especially with states of the former USSR, including 
Russia. These have extensive agendas for cooperation, but no legally binding preferential 
or free trade provisions. They rely on WTO tariff schedules. While many of these 
agreements are now two decades old, or have been replaced by the three DCFTAs, there 
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is an ongoing effort to revise and update them. For example the EU has made in 2015 a 
new ‘Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ with Kazakhstan in this 
category. It has the same comprehensive list of topics as in many other of the EU’s recent 
agreements including the DCFTA, but these are almost all limited to ‘best endeavors to 
cooperate’, with no binding commitments beyond references to WTO rules. This means 
that the economic impact of this category of agreement may be limited to a soft 
improvement of the mutual business climate, possible encouraging direct investment, but 
they are otherwise in economic terms little more than the WTO model. Therefore the 
PCA model is not interesting for the UK. While, mentioned about "partnership", the EU 
has ‘strategic partnerships’ with countries of the world deemed to be most important for 
economic and/or political reasons, including the US, Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, 
Korea, India, Brazil, and South Africa. The main feature is the holding of regular annual 
or twice yearly summit meetings to discuss global as well as bilateral issues. Some are 
combined with FTAs (Canada, Mexico, Korea), with some FTAs are currently under 
negotiation (US, Japan, Brazil), but others are without preferential trade arrangements in 
the foreseeable future (China).  
 
The EU has had an informal strategic partnership with Russia, with twice-yearly 
summit meetings, but these are suspended given the sanctions policy triggered by the 
Ukraine crisis. The term ‘strategic partnership’ is to be compared with the ‘association 
agreement’ as representing the political framing of the relationship with the EU. The 
strategic partnership has connotations of top-level global affairs, whereas the association 
agreement is shared with the EU’s smaller neighbors. For this reason it is not surprising 
that the UK Prime Minister says she is looking for a ‘strategic partnership’ in discussing 
the UK’s possible future relationship with the EU, which she seems to want to combine 
with a CFTA, to which I mentioned above. 
 
3.3.4.  Free Trade Agreement  
 
A free-trade area is the region encompassing a trade bloc whose member countries 
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have signed a free-trade agreement (FTA). Such agreements involve cooperation between 
at least two countries to reduce trade barriers like import quotas and tariffs and to 
increase trade of goods and services with each other. If people are also free to move 
between the countries, in addition to a free-trade agreement, it would also be considered 
an open border. It can be considered the second stage of economic integration. In this 
case, if UK and EU make the FTA for future development, here are the FTA issues 
checklist focusing on 5 different areas for no-deal Brexit to keep Britain trading. Here are 
some examples. 
 
First, the customs system, its big enough to cope with the 255 million additional 
declarations that will need to be made each year, including fast-track arrangements for 
approved traders, pre-clearance of goods before a journey begins and post-payment of 
duties to avoid detention in ports. 
 
Then, learning support for the 185,000 UK businesses that currently trade solely 
with the EU and will need to learn how to do customs declarations for the first time. And 
the equally frictionless arrangements by other EU countries exports are their imports, so 
it’s not just a question of getting the goods out of the UK, they will need to clear EU 
Customs as well. Avoid vehicle checks at “roll on, roll off (ro-ro)” ports at all costs – an 
additional two minutes in clearance times at Dover will create a motorway queue 17 
miles long, and delays in the days following the UK’s departure from the EU could be 
significantly longer than this at peak times. 
 
Last but not least, the no-cliff edge.  Exporters and importers will need time to 
learn what they have to do under the new trading regime, as well as changing their 
procedures and instructing their staff.  As James Hookham, FTA’s Deputy Chief 
Executive says, so far these businesses have no details of what is expected of them 
beyond the broad statements in yesterday’s White Paper: “Business cannot be expected to 
sort it all out at the last minute.  It is not just about the Government being ready.” 
 
Due to the discerption and the fact we know, according the OECD's prediction 
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and the calculation, once UK make the FTA rules with EU, the total export is less than 
6.4% comparing with today and decreasing 3.1% for EU's export, meanwhile decrease 
the 6.3% import from EU. Several studies consider this scenario, and model trade based 
on continued access to EU markets but with the additional costs of customs checks, and 
potential changes to the tariff the UK would apply to imports. 
 
One difference in assumptions is whether the UK is able to replicate the EU’s 
existing free trade deals. HMT assumes not, while NIESR, Open Europe, Oxford 
Economics and PwC/CBI assume this happens immediately. Unfortunately, none of the 
studies flexes this assumption in its sensitivity analysis, so we cannot be sure how 
important it is in terms of describing the reduction in trade. However, the overall 
similarities in the model results for this option suggest it is not a dominant factor. 
 
There is virtually no forward-looking analysis of the effect of potential trade deals 
with countries that would be the most important economic powers in the coming decades. 
Open Europe cites Ciuriak et al. (2015), who suggest in a ‘back-of-the-envelope’ 
calculation that ‘an Australia-like run of FTAs with the major East Asian economies 
(China, Japan, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]) should 
generate something on the order of a net of 0.6% of GDP for the UK’. Still, this estimate 
appears to be on current economy sizes and would, in any case, only arise as a benefit in 
this analysis if the EU failed to reach a similar agreement. 
 
In summary, within this option, the studies that report trade impacts broadly agree 
on the level of reduced trade at around 15% (see Annex 2). Most suggest direct negative 
impacts on GDP through reduced trade of between 1 and 2% and Ciuriak et al. (2015), 
whose analysis underpins Open Europe’s work, suggest that the direct trade impact is 
also –1%. Despite some differences in assumptions over how quickly or ably the UK can 
strike further trade deals, these analyses reinforce the conclusion earlier that the loss of 




3.4. The EU’s response  
 
What the EU27 want is Brexit red lines from the other side of the table. The 
British government’s key Brexit red lines – controlling EU immigration, defend the unity 
of the EU, maintain the link between the single market and free movement and keep good 
trade links with the UK. The EU mainly focus on those four parts to discuss the all details 
those 2 years for "devoice". 
 
According to the report recently published, the European Union announced 
unilaterally take off the draft agreement 118 pages, six parts, covering the Northern 
Ireland and the Irish border, the transitional arrangements, focus issues, such as in the 
European Union citizens' rights. 
 
By releasing the draft, the EU showed Britain its tough stance in the Brexit 
negotiations. Expressing the draft, after Britain to take off the Northern Ireland should 
remain in the EU customs union, this means that the UK after taking off the Northern 
Ireland and the Irish won't appear "" hard boundaries, but belong to the main island of a 
country's territory in Northern Ireland and the UK will be separated by a" border trade ". 
 
In addition, the draft request Britain officially take off in March 2019, after the 
transition period until December 31, 2020, the deadline of the EU's long-term budget plan 
at present, then the UK must be completely off the end of transition. 
 
Take off the transition period, the draft regulations, the UK must comply with the 
eu laws and regulations, and the 27 member states in the transition period of the new law, 
at the same time, the British don't have the right to vote or decision-making, has no right 
to nominate or elected members of the EU institutions. 
 
Draft regulations, Britain and the European Union to take off the agreement as 
soon as possible after disputes, including "breakup fee", in the European Union citizens' 





On the eve of the release of the draft, the EU's chief negotiator, Barnier, "played 
down" the EU's tough stance, saying that the draft contained "nothing new" in the 
agreement reached between the two sides. After the draft was announced, Mr. Barnier 
again claimed that the EU's aim was to speed up the process of EU negotiations without 
provoking Britain. 
 
So for now the attitude and measures are both tough and kind of strike. While 
what they expect is that their benefit is same and stable. Since the UK made the 
discussion, even EU hold the cold attitude to all speech from May, like The financial 
times saying,  although the EU on May the prime minister's speech denial, but the British 
finally puts forward some concrete Suggestions, after all is a little progress, may let the 




















4. Economic Impacts: Quantitative Estimates and Qualitative 
Assessments  
 
There have been a number of model-based attempts to simulate the impact of 
Brexit, of which several estimate the impacts on both the UK and the EU27. Of these 
three are from official sources (OECD, UK Treasury, Netherlands Central Planning 
Bureau), Table 4 and from Figure 7 to Figure 8 for the general brief summary of different 
results, and Annexes 3-5 for explanation of the methodologies and more detailed 
information.  
 
While these model simulations cannot capture all the likely economic effects of 
the Brexit, as explained further below, I do provide a cluster of findings that are close to a 
consensus view on the relative size of the impacts of economic and one more step 
explanation of public finance. Given that the changes of national income and key issues 
of fiscal policy, it is hardly surprising that the economic impacts and trade impact are 
quite an influence the future UK's development path.  
 
4.1. Impact of changes in national income and public finance  
 
The most obvious impact of a larger or smaller economy is, in cash terms, to 
increase or reduce the level of tax receipts. If the average tax rate on economic activity 
remained constant, then cash receipts would grow in line with the economy. So, for 
example, if tax receipts were 40% of national income and the economy grew by an 
additional 1%, we might expect tax receipts also to grow by an additional 1% and tax 
receipts as a share of national income to remain unchanged at 40%. However, this would 
ignore the fact that in progressive tax systems, such as the UK’s, the average tax rate rises 
with growth in the tax base. So, for example, if tax receipts were expected to be 40% of 
national income and the economy grew by an additional 1%, we would expect tax 
receipts to grow by more than 1% and tax receipts as a share of national income to edge 
above 40%. Conversely, if the economy grew by less than expected, then we would also 




On the spending side, for the large parts of the public sector where cash budgets 
have been set, there is, by default, no impact of economic growth on spending in cash 
terms. This means that, for example, if public spending were forecast to be 40% of 
national income and the economy turned out to be 1% smaller than expected, then (if the 
forecast for public spending in cash terms proved correct) this would lead to public 
spending as a share of national income rising to 40.4% of national income (as 40/0.99 = 
40.4). There is an additional impact on public spending as spending on social security 
benefits, tax credits and debt interest would be greater in cash terms if the economy were 
smaller than expected. This would push spending up further as a share of national 
income. The scale of these effects in the UK has been estimated by the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR), updating previous analysis done by HM Treasury, in order to 
assess the extent to which the ups-and-downs of the economic cycle flatter or depress 
headline measures of the public finances. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 
4. This shows the impact on current receipts (that is, total tax and non-tax receipts 
flowing to the public sector), total managed expenditure (that is, total public spending) 
and public sector net borrowing (which is the difference between total managed 
expenditure and current receipts) of a 1% reduction in national income. All the estimates 
are measuring how these fiscal aggregates are affected in terms of their share of national 
income.  
 
Illustrative impact on the public finances of a 1% reduction in national income (% 
of national income) Fiscal aggregate 
 
 Year 1 effect  Additional year 2 
effect  
Total effect  
Current receipts  –0.1  –0.1  –0.2  
Total managed expenditure  +0.4  +0.1  +0.5  
Public sector net borrowing  +0.5  +0.2  +0.7  




4.2. Key issues and fiscal policy 
 
Chapter 2 of this article described the direct impact not only on the public 
finances of the UK leaving the EU but also the sociality situations about the changes of 
UK's exit behavior. This set out one important scenario in which total public spending 
therefore public sector net borrowing, it would be around £8 billion a year, or 0.4% of 
GDP lower than before. This assumed that the UK did not make any financial 
contribution to the EU budget but did choose to fund all of the transfers and services in 
the UK that the EU currently finances. 
 
Chapter 3 of the article described various estimates and models, including those 
produced by HM Treasury and from outside of government, of the impact on the size of 
the UK economy of the UK leaving the EU with different agreements if they choose. 
These estimates covered a wide range of possibilities. But if leaving the EU did as seems 
more likely than not increase uncertainty in the short term and, over the longer term, lead 
to a reduction in trade and foreign direct investment, then it would be reasonable to 
expect this to lead to the UK economy being smaller in future than it otherwise would 
have been. That is the prediction of the large majority of those who have modelled the 
likely effects. 
 
This chapter takes account of both the direct improvement in the public finances 
that would result from lower EU contributions and the various estimates for the impact on 
the size of the UK economy of the UK leaving the EU and describes what effect these 
could be expected to have on the public finances. Section 4.3 focuses on the short term 
and, in particular, the period through 2019 to 2020, describing the size of any changes to 
tax or spending that might be necessary if borrowing were to be reduced by the end of 
this parliament as is currently planned. Section 4.4 turns to look at the longer term. 
However, Section 4.1 describes the mechanisms by which changes in the size of the 
economy feed into changes in the public finances and presents a sense of scale of how 
large these effects might be and how they compare with the potential £8 billion reduction 
in borrowing set out in Chapter 3. Section 3.3 provides a brief conclusion. So here I list 
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some key issues for the uncertainty and short-term impacts. 
 
The prospect of the UK leaving the European Union is likely to have an economic 
effect both in advance of the referendum and, in the event of a vote for exit, in the period 
following it while the UK and the EU agree on the plans and terms for exit. 
 
The UK economy is already seeing some of these effects with sterling volatility 
rising (NIESR, 2016). The Bank of England’s May quarterly inflation report notes 
sterling is 9% below its November peak and concludes ‘there is evidence to suggest that 
roughly half of that decline reflects perceived risks associated with the referendum’. 
Following an out vote, there would be an effect from uncertainty about the specifics of 
the UK trade and policy framework. In this section, I consider these impacts, which in 
general are anticipated to apply from now up to around 2020. 
4.2.1. The exit process 
 
After a vote to exit, the UK would notify the EU of its intention to withdraw – 
though not necessarily immediately – and the process is then governed by Article 50 of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The UK has a two-year window to negotiate a withdrawal agreement, 
although most commentators recognize that, given the time taken over most trade 
agreements, this could be extended. Free Trade Agreement negotiations typically take a 
number of years to agree, with OECD (2016) suggesting that at least three years (for 
example, US–Australia) are needed, with Switzerland–China and EU–Mexico both 
taking four years, EU–Canada taking over five years and EU–Switzerland taking 10 
years. 
 
The long time taking action could cause the fiscal policy's unbalance for such 
long economic circle. As we know, any economic influence could show it effective 




4.2.2. Uncertainty and its impact on the economy 
 
There are several mechanisms by which this uncertainty affects current and near-
term economic variables. Uncertainty is likely to lead to both companies and households 
delaying their investment or spending decisions. Sterling would lose value in light of 
anticipated or actual reductions in demand from investors for sterling-based assets. A 
reduction in demand for UK assets may also affect the government’s borrowing costs if 
demand for gilts falls (which reduces the price or – in other words – pushes up the 
interest rate). This would in turn reduce the spending power of households as the cost of 
borrowing and the price of imported goods rise. Exports may see some benefit 
(notwithstanding any reduction in investment from increased uncertainty that occurs 
within export-orientated industries) if sterling is weaker, with a potential improvement in 
the UK’s trade balance. The capital market always reflect on the uncertainty elements 
directly and quickly.  
 
Brexit could create an extended period of uncertainty that damages confidence 
and the appetite for both domestic and inward investment in the rest of the EU. But 
perhaps the biggest risk is political contagion from the ‘proof of concept’ of leaving the 
EU, with Brexit encouraging disintegrative political forces elsewhere in Europe. Here are 
several mainly elements need to be consider somehow may influence the final answer 
about Brexit. 
 
 A protracted renegotiation, followed by a vote to exit in a UK referendum and the 
negotiation of a withdrawal agreement under Article 50, leading to a radically 
redefined relationship between the UK and the EU, would dominate the attention 
of the European institutions and, for significant periods of time, political leaders 
in Europe, distracting them from other priorities. 
 The uncertainty that would impact on the UK would also impact on the rest of the 
EU, even if not to the same extent. But with confidence low, and growth prospects 
weak, the effect may nonetheless be significant. 
 Uncertainty over Brexit could have a particular impact on EU trade policy. It 
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would be much harder to conclude a deal on, for example, TTIP, if the US is 
unsure who the other party to the agreement will be. It may greatly complicate 
other important policy areas, such as financial services, which is overseen by a 
Commissioner who was nominated by the UK. 
 Brexit may have broader political implications. The EU might be strengthened 
with the departure of a sometimes awkward member. But European leaders may 
also worry about political contagion –Brexit could liberate centrifugal forces in 
the EU, particularly if the UK leaves on favorable terms or succeeds outside the 
EU. This is arguably the biggest risk to the rest of the EU. 
 This may mean the EU has an incentive to raise the cost of exit by refusing to 
negotiate a special deal for the UK, or by excluding the UK from parts of the 
single market. The latter, particularly if it is politically motivated, would raise the 
direct economic costs of Brexit for the EU and the associated uncertainty. 
 
Above all, I could say it is a long-term progress with a lot of question waited to 
figure out the effective solution in a limit timeline. I will try to figure out some of them in 
a clear mathematic way later. 
4.2.3.  Trade impact 
 
There are two key elements to the impacts on trade: first, how overall levels of 
trade will be affected and, second, what knock-on those changes will have on the 
economy. This subsection looks at how trade patterns might be affected, the different 
types of models used to assess changes, and the potential economic impact in each of the 
potential trade policy scenarios. It then considers whether trade impacts could also affect 
productivity levels. 
 
In all of the options available outside of the EU, UK trade with the EU would face 
additional frictions in terms of tariffs, customs checks or potential inability43 to provide 
services in the EU single market. Even if the UK were able to strike a new As such, in the 
face of these additional costs, some trade would become unprofitable and overall trade 
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with the EU would be lower as a result. As around half of our current trade is with the EU 
(44% of exports, 53% of imports; see Table 3 earlier), this could affect a significant 
proportion of trade. 
 
What about trade beyond the EU? If the UK is able to agree trade deals with non-
EU countries, this could increase our trade with those countries. Trade deals tend to focus 
on tariff measures (for example, taxes on imports); harmonizing non-tariff measures (for 
example, product regulation) tends to take longer and involve aligning regulatory 
approaches (Open Europe, 2016). Tariffs have reduced significantly over recent decades, 
and non-tariff measures are increasingly seen as important to increased trade (CEP, 
2016a). So, even as we look below at the potential to strike trade deals with other 
countries, we need to keep in mind that, unless the UK would share sovereignty with 
those non-EU countries (in a similar way to the EU), then the trade agreements would not 
provide equivalent access to those markets. 
 
In terms of UK trade beyond the EU, it could be possible for the UK to strike 
better, or faster, trade deals than the EU could. The EU has a head start in that it already 
has deals with over 55 countries. The UK may be able to ‘grandfather’ these deals, i.e. 
quickly strike very similar deals. But this is not guaranteed. More generally, the UK 
would have less to offer countries in terms of access to its own market (the UK’s 
economy is only around a sixth of the EU’s), but granting access to the UK would be less 
of a threat to countries keen to protect their own industries. As a single country, the UK 
may also have less difficulty in reaching a deal. 
 
It seems likely that, over time, the UK would, if they wanted, strike bilateral Free 
Trade Agreements with big countries (Canada and Australia have done so with the US). 
Switzerland has agreed a deal with China44 ahead of the EU. It is important to be clear 
that, despite the name, such ‘free trade agreements’ do not go as far as the full market 
integration offered by EU membership. New deals would likely cover a smaller 
proportion of trade than the EU and its current deals (HM Treasury (2016a) estimates the 
EU and its trade agreements cover 56% of UK exports and 63% of imports). It is 
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therefore likely that overall trade would still fall (see modelling estimates in Table 5). 
Still over, say, a 30-year horizon, the make-up of UK trade partners could change. For 
example, continued fast growth of China (the destination for 3.1% of exports in 2015 data 
are form Bank Of England 2016) could lead to a fivefold increase in its GDP by 2050.45 
However, the key consideration in non-EU trade is not only whether non-EU economies 
would become more important economically, but whether EU membership or Brexit is 
likely to confer better access to those markets. Given the EU’s head start, larger market 
but more diverse needs, this is difficult to predict.  
 
So, overall on non-EU trade prospects, in the short term the UK would struggle to 
achieve similar access to that which it currently enjoys as part of the EU and its existing 
FTAs. In the long term, the situation is much harder to predict. In terms of a combined 
EU and non-EU trade picture, it therefore seems clear that non-EU trade deals would not 
compensate for the loss of EU trade in the short term and would, perhaps, be unlikely to 
do so even over a longer time horizon. 
 
The third option (WTO) would mean UK exports effectively faced the ‘most 
favored nation’ tariffs agreed at the World Trade Organization. These are by definition 
higher than would be faced under trade agreements and would act as a friction or barrier 
to exports and reduce them from current levels. The UK could nevertheless choose what 
level of tariffs to apply to imports and the ‘unilateral free trade’ option would reduce 
these to zero and potentially eliminate border checks. This would reduce the costs of 
imports to both producers and consumers, and increased imports would apply competitive 
pressures to UK producers with a knock-on to productivity levels. We return to the 
economic impact of this later. 
 
Modelling estimates of impact of Brexit on Trade and FDI 
 










-12.6 None FDI effect captured in 
trade 
 Static EEA -8 None Assessed separately 
 Static WTO -14.5 None Assessed separately 
     
HM Treasury EEA -9 -10  
 FTA -14to-19 -15to-20  
 WTO -17to-24 -18to-26  
     
OECD WTO/FTA -10to-20 -10to-45  
     
NIESR EEA -11to-16 -10  
 FTA -13to-18 -17  
 WTO -21to-29 -24  
 WTO+ -22 -24  
Source: NIESR (2016) summary of modelling results; CEP (2016a and 2016b). 
Table5 
 
Overall on trade patterns, any exit scenario is almost certain to reduce UK trade 
with our current biggest trade partner, the EU, and potentially with the (over 55) 
countries the EU has an existing trade deal with. Estimates available from the studies, as 
shown in Table 3.8, suggest overall trade would fall by between 8 and 29%. In scenarios 
where the UK could make its own non-EU trade deals, perhaps it could strike quicker or 
better deals than the EU, and non-EU trade could grow more quickly and eventually 
offset at least some of this decline. On balance, Brexit offers a chance of non-EU trade 
increasing more quickly in the long term, but the strong likelihood of an ongoing 
reduction in trade with the EU. Finally, ‘unilateral free trade’ would have some positive 
knock-ons to competitiveness and productivity through cheaper imports, but exports 
would face significant additional tariff and non-tariff measures. 
 
In summary, it is likely the UK would see a material reduction in trade. These 
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changes would also reduce ‘openness’ of the UK’s economy, in terms of trade as a 
proportion of GDP, at least into the medium term. Estimating how much trade would 
reduce, and what impact this would have on the economy, involves relatively 
sophisticated modelling, and we next consider the different approaches, before examining 
the economic impacts.  
4.3. Scenarios for the short term inflection of public finance 
 
This section turns to consider explicitly what some of the estimates surveyed in 
Chapter 3 of the possible impact of the UK leaving the EU on national income in the 
short term would mean for the UK’s public finances. The estimates are calculated using 
the relationship between national income and the public finances described in detail in 
the previous section. Most of the estimates also assume that the direct impact of the UK 
leaving the EU would be to strengthen the public finances by £8 billion a year (as 
described in Chapter 2). 
 
The exception to this is the scenarios modelled by the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research (NIESR) where the UK joins the EEA on similar terms to 
Norway. Under this scenario, in the analysis that follows, it is assumed that the UK’s net 
contribution to the EU would be reduced by half, or £4 billion, from £8 billion to £4 
billion. As described in Section 2.2, Norway’s net financial contribution to the EU 
appears to be lower than that of the UK, but it is difficult to predict what the UK would 
contribute were it to join the EEA: on a per-person basis, Norway’s contribution is about 
three-quarters of the UK’s, while on a share-of-national-income basis, it is about 40% of 
the UK’s. So a reduction of 50% is, perhaps, not implausible. 
 
The estimated impacts on borrowing in the short run for a number of studies are 
shown in Table 6. This includes all of the main estimates of the impact of the UK leaving 
the EU on the UK’s GDP that have been produced in the last couple of years that we are 
aware of. The vast majority, for reasons explained in the previous chapter, show a 




The studies are ranked from the largest decline in national income at the top (6%, 
produced by Société Générale) to the largest increase in national income at the bottom 
(1.6%, produced by Economists for Brexit). The second column gives the percentage 
change in national income. The third column gives the estimated resulting change – 
usually increase – in public sector net borrowing as a share of national income, while the 
fourth expresses this in 2016–17 £ billion.66 The worst-case scenario from the studies 
included in Table 6 is for borrowing to be increased by 3.8% of national income, which is 
equivalent to £74 billion. At the other end of the table, the best-case scenario is for a 
much rosier situation: borrowing is reduced by 1.5% of national income, or £30 billion in 
today’s terms. 
 
To help give a better sense of the scale of these estimates, the final column of 
Table 6 presents the change in public sector net borrowing divided by the current number 
of households in the UK (27.0 million in 201567). This is not to say that should any tax 
rises and spending cuts be implemented, these would fall equally on all households. It is 
also the case that should the UK population turn out to be larger (or smaller), then this 
would lead to the resulting cost or gain per household being smaller (or larger). Despite 
these caveats, these figures are a reasonable way of giving a feel for how significant these 
changes in borrowing would be. 
 
The worst-case scenario presented in Table 6 leads to borrowing in 2019–20 
increasing by the equivalent of £2,750 per current UK household. So tax rises or 
spending cuts of this magnitude, on average, would need to be delivered if borrowing 
were to be returned to its current forecast path. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
rosiest scenario would lead to borrowing falling by £1,100 per current UK household. If 
correct, a combination of tax cuts and spending increases worth this much on average 
would be possible while leaving borrowing unchanged from that forecast by the OBR in 
the March 2016 Budget. 
 
HM Treasury’s short-term analysis (not contained in Table 5) is for a ‘shock 
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scenario’ where national income is reduced by 3.6% and a ‘severe shock’ scenario where 
it is reduced by 6.0%. It estimates that these shocks would be associated with a £24 
billion and a £39 billion increase in public sector net borrowing in 2017–18, respectively. 
These are much smaller increases in public sector net borrowing than implied by the 
methodology used to construct Table 6 This is because the Treasury’s shock involves 
much higher inflation, which it implicitly assumes leads to spending by Whitehall 
departments on the delivery and administration of public services being less generous in 
real terms. In other words, it has built a significant real cut to public spending into its 
numbers. 
 
Short-run impact on public finance from difference scenarios for GDP and a reduction in 











PwC/CBI -4.25 +2.6 +50 
Nomura -4 +2.4 +46 
CITI -4 +2.4 +46 
OECD -3.3 +1.9 +37 
NIESR    
-WTO pessimistic -3.5 +2.0 +40 
-WTO optimistic -2.8 +`.5 +30 
-FTA pessimistic -2.5 +1.3 +26 
-FTA optimistic -2.2 +1.1 +22 
-EEA pessimistic -2.4 +1.5 +29 
-EEA optimistic -2.1 +1.3 +25 
Deutsche Bank -3 +1.7 +33 
Morgan Stanley -2 +1.0 +19 
Credit Suisse -1.5 +0.6 +12 
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HSBC -1.25 +0.5 +9 
JP Morgan -1 +0.3 +6 
Mansfield +0.1 -0.5 -9 




The estimates from NIESR are, of the studies included above, based on the most 
comprehensive economic modelling exercise. My judgement is that they data provide a 
credible view of the possible effects of the UK leaving the EU. The estimates also sit 
towards the middle of the range of all estimates. Furthermore, the most recent edition of 
the National Institute Economic Review includes NIESR’s estimates of the impact of the 
UK leaving the EU for each year through to 2020. This allows a comparison of the path 
of GDP, public sector net borrowing and public sector net debt under each of the 
scenarios that NIESR models. Here, this is done by taking the OBR’s latest forecast as 
the baseline and showing the impact of the deviations to GDP as suggested by the NIESR 
scenarios. For brevity, this is done for the forecasts under the two WTO and EEA 
scenarios, but not the two FTA scenarios, since these have impacts on GDP that lie in 
between the other scenarios. Figure 7 presents the resulting estimated path for GDP under 
each scenario. This shows that under the EEA scenarios (both optimistic and pessimistic), 
all of the short-term hit to GDP growth would be felt by the end of 2018. In contrast, 
under the pessimistic WTO scenario, growth continues to be noticeably weaker in 2019. 
 
Comparison of the latest OBR forecast for GDP with how these might be affected 





Source: OBR  
Figure 7 
 
The estimated paths for public sector net borrowing under each of these scenarios 
for GDP are presented in Figure 8. It is assumed that the UK’s net financial contribution 
to the EU continues to the end of 2017–18, but thereafter it is reduced by one-half under 
the EEA scenarios and eliminated completely under the WTO scenarios. Under all the 
scenarios, the deficit as a share of national income is projected to fall each year. Under 
the two EEA scenarios, it is projected to fall by 1.8% of national income between2015–
16 and 2018–19, while under the two WTO scenarios, it is projected to fall by 2.0% of 
national income. The slightly greater fall in the deficit under the WTO scenarios is 
despite weaker growth and is explained by the assumption that the UK’s financial 
contribution to the EU is completely eliminated under this scenario by 2018–19, whereas 
under the EEA scenarios it is assumed to be running at half of its current level. But under 
all four scenarios where the UK leaves the EU, the reduction in the deficit is smaller than 
the 2.9% of national income decline between2015–16 and 2018–19 that is forecast by the 
OBR. 
 
OBR forecast Public sector net borrowing and how those would be effect by NIESR 







In 2019–20 under all four scenarios for the UK leaving the EU, public sector net 
borrowing would still be positive. This implies that a further set of net tax rises and 
spending cuts would be required if a budget surplus were to be delivered before the 
planned date of the next UK general election, in line with the government’s current 
ambition. 
 
The scale of measures required to achieve a budget surplus by 2019–20 varies 
across the scenarios. But the most optimistic scenario set out in Figure 8 is for a deficit of 
0.8% of national income in 2019–20, which would be a deficit of £17 billion in that year. 
This would be £28 billion greater than the £10.4 billion surplus forecast by the OBR for 
2019–20, as shown in Table 7. 
 
An additional fiscal tightening of 0.8% of national income (£15 billion in today’s 
terms) – on top of what is already planned for this parliament – would be far from easy to 
deliver. For example, it is roughly the amount that would be saved if the government 
increased the cuts to day-to-day spending by central government on the delivery and 
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administration of public services planned for this parliament by 40% (from £12 billion to 
£17 billion), increased the size of the planned cuts to social security benefits and tax 
credits by 40% (from £12 billion to £17 billion) and also increased the basic and higher 
rates of income tax by 1p (which would raise an estimated £5½ billion). Even this would 
only achieve a forecast budget balance. To restore the 0.5% of national income surplus 
that the Chancellor is currently aiming for would require a further £10 billion of spending 
cuts and tax rises to be found. 
 













Deficit in 2019-20 £28bn £21bn £20bn £17bn 
Tightening to restore 
£10.4bn 
£39bn £31bn £31bn £27bn 
Additional years of 
austerity at current pace 
to restore £10.4bn 
surplus 
2.0years 1.4years 1.3years 1.1years 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility  
Table 7 
The government’s fiscal mandate specifies that there should be an overall budget 
surplus in each year from 2019–20 onwards. But this rule is automatically suspended in 
periods of weak economic performance. Specifically, should growth over four 
consecutive quarters appear to fall below 1%, or should the OBR forecast that growth 
over four quarters will be less than 1%, then the rule is suspended. This suspension would 
occur under three of the NIESR scenarios set out in Figure 8 as they involve calendar-
year GDP growth dropping below 1%. While under the other scenario – the EEA 
optimistic scenario – growth reaches a low of 1.2% in 2017, it is still possible the rule 




Even if the fiscal mandate were not suspended, the type of trade-off set out above 
might well lead the Chancellor to decide to allow budget deficits to persist throughout 
this parliament and the rule to be broken. If a budget surplus is still deemed desirable, this 
could then be brought about through an extension of austerity further beyond 2019–20. 
Such a course of action would not be surprising: both of the government’s other fiscal 
targets set for this parliament (the cap on forecast welfare spending and the requirement 
that debt should fall as a share of national income every year) have already been 
breached. And, should a scenario such as that suggested in Figure8, materialize, 
extending austerity into the next parliament may well be preferable to additional austerity 
in this parliament. (Another chancellor might, of course, simply decide to live with an 
ongoing deficit.) 
 
Under the NIESR scenarios, growth in 2020 would actually be stronger if the UK 
left the EU than if it remained in it, as some of the costs of short-term uncertainty 
dissipate and some of the assumed longer-term costs from lower trade volumes and lower 
foreign direct investment (FDI) are not fully in place. This reduces the size of the 
necessary fiscal action if a surplus of 0.5% of national income is to be restored after 
2019–20. 
 
The UK’s current fiscal consolidation, comprising tax increases, benefit cuts and 
cuts to spending on public services, announced since the March 2008 budget, in response 
to the financial crisis and associated recession, are estimated to total just over 10% of 
national income. This is taking place over the current decade, so entails a tightening of 
roughly 1% of national income per year. As set out in Table 7, under the most optimistic 
NIESR scenario for economic growth presented above, continuing austerity for a little 
more than one more year would be sufficient to restore a surplus of 0.5% of national 
income. This would mean the era of austerity coming to an end after 2021–22.71.Under 




4.4. Scenarios for the long term public finance impact 
 
This section turns to look at the longer-term impact of the UK leaving the EU on 
the public finances. The exercise that is done here is simpler than that in the last section. 
For this, it is assumed that public spending continues to run at 37.0% of national income, 
which is the level forecast by the OBR for 2019–20. This is consistent with the sort of 
methodology used by the OBR in its long-term fiscal forecasts and is consistent with a 
view that, as the size of the economy changes over time, the size of the state tends to alter 
in proportion to the size of the economy. Therefore lower – or higher – levels of future 
national income naturally lead to smaller or greater sums being available to spend 
publicly, as well as private consumption also being reduced or increased. 
 
As before, the direct impact of the UK leaving the EU is also taken into account: 
in most scenarios, it is again assumed that this would be to strengthen the public finances 
by £8 billion a year (as described in Chapter 2). The exception to this is the ‘EEA’ 
scenarios, where it is assumed that the UK joins the EEA on what might be considered 
similar terms to Norway’s. As before, it is assumed that this leads to a one-half reduction 
in the UK’s net financial contribution to the EU. 
 
As was the case in the previous section, results are presented for all of the main 
modelled estimates of the impact of the UK leaving the EU on the UK’s GDP that have 
been produced in the last couple of years that we are aware of. Again the vast majority, 
for reasons explained in the previous chapter, show a negative effect on GDP. 
 
The estimated long-run impact on the public finances is shown in Table 8. The 
table shows the percentage change (usually a fall) in national income and the change 
(also usually a fall) in the amount available to spend publicly. 
 
A 2% reduction in national income would, with public spending at 37.0% of 
national income, reduce public spending by £14 billion (in 2016–17 terms). If the UK’s 
net financial contribution to the EU were completely eliminated, it would offset £8 billion 
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of this, leaving a £6 billion cut to public spending. 
 
Estimated long-run impact on public finances from different scenarios for GDP 
and a reduction in the UK’s net EU contribution 
 
 GDP changes (%) £bn change in spending (2016-2017) 
CEP   
-dynamic EEA/FTA -7.9 -49 
-static WTO -2.6 -11 
-static EEA -1.4 -5 
 
HM Treasury   
-WTO -7.5 -46 
-FTA -6.2 -37 
-EEA -3.8 -23 
 
NIESR   
-WTO+ -7.8 -48 
-WTO -3.2 -15 
-FTA -2.1 -7 
-EEA -1.8 -9 
 
OECD -5.1 -29 
 
PwC/CBI   
-WTO -3.5 -17 
-FTA -1.2 -1 
 
Economists for Brexit +4.0 +37 




The majority of the estimates in Table 8 are for a larger reduction in national 
income than 2%. For example, the three scenarios produced by the Treasury imply 
reductions in national income of 7.5%, 6.2% and 3.8%. Under these scenarios, the 
calculations presented in Table 8 suggest that the public finances would be weakened by 
£46 billion, £37 billion and £23 billion, respectively. These estimates are very slightly 
above the Treasury’s own estimates (of £45 billion, £36 billion and £20 billion, 
respectively72). The method employed is the same; the reason for the differences is that 
the Treasury takes receipts to be 37.4% of national income (the level forecast by the OBR 
for 2020–21) and differences in the assumed reduction in financial contributions to the 
EU. 
 
A final thing to note about the Treasury’s public finance estimates relates to how 
they have been described. In the foreword to the Treasury document (HM Treasury, 
2016a), the Chancellor writes that ‘Based on the Treasury’s estimates, UK GDP would be 
6.2% lower, families would be £4,300 worse off and tax receipts would face an annual 
£36 billion black hole’. The use of the word ‘and’ here is wrong. This is because the 
reduction in national income, of 6.2% or £4,300 per family, already encompasses the 
public finance impact: i.e. it covers not just the reduction in households’ after-tax 
incomes but also the cut to public spending that would be required to leave borrowing 
unchanged. It is not necessarily inappropriate to describe the deterioration in the 
government’s finances as making households worse off (since the government ought only 
to be doing public spending that benefits households), but it is not appropriate to suggest 
that this would be in addition to the £4,300 per family figure. 
 
Using the estimates from NIESR (to be consistent with the short-run section and 
because they span most of the available estimates), the possible long-run reductions in 
national income range from 1.8% to 7.8%. The calculations presented in Table 7 suggest 
that this would reduce the amount available to be spent publicly by between £7 billion 
and £48 billion a year. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that none of these estimates explicitly accounts for 
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possible effects of leaving the EU on immigration. It seems most likely that immigration 
would be lower in this situation. Because immigrants, and especially those from the EU, 
are on average younger, better educated and more likely to be in work than the native 
population, numerous studies – for example, Dustmann and Frattini (2014) and Portes 
(2015) – have shown that immigration has a positive effect on the public finances. The 
Office for Budget Responsibility (2015) suggests that, in the long run, its low net 
immigration scenario would involve the public finances being more than 1% of national 
income weaker than in its high immigration scenario. 
4.5. Conclusions for public finance  
 
The direct impact of the UK leaving the EU would be to reduce – and possibly 
eliminate – the UK’s net financial contribution to the EU. Eliminating this would reduce 
public spending, and therefore public sector net borrowing, by up to £8 billion a year. In 
the absence of any other effects on the UK then, if borrowing were to be left unchanged, 
this would allow net tax cuts or spending increases of up to £8 billion to be implemented. 
 
But numerous studies have suggested that the UK economy would be affected by 
the UK leaving the EU. And in the majority of cases, the estimates suggest that the 
increase in uncertainty in the short term and the likely reduction in trade and foreign 
direct investment over the longer term would reduce national income. This would weaken 
the public finances. 
 
In the near term, reduced economic growth would push up public spending as a 
share of national income – largely because fixed cash spending plans would represent a 
larger slice of a smaller national cake. And the progressivity of the UK tax system means 
that weaker growth would result not only in tax revenues growing less quickly in cash 
terms but in them representing a smaller share of (the reduced) national income. 





Of the studies considered, the short-run estimates from NIESR are based on the 
most comprehensive economic modelling exercise. Taking the most optimistic scenario 
for growth from NIESR’s analysis, and using official estimates of how growth affects the 
public finances, suggests that in 2019–20 there would be a deficit 1.3% of national 
income or around £25 billion higher than currently planned. That is, there would be a 
deficit of 0.8% of national income rather than the surplus of 0.5% of national income that 
the OBR is currently forecasting. In NIESR’s most pessimistic scenario, the deficit would 
be 1.8% of national income or around £40 billion higher than currently forecast. 
 
Even on NIESR’s most optimistic scenario, aiming for budget balance would 
require an additional fiscal tightening of 0.8% of national income, or £15 billion in 
today’s terms. Achieving this – on top of what is already planned for this parliament – 
would not be easy: for example, even increasing the cuts to day-to-day spending by 
central government and the planned cuts to social security benefits by 40% would still 
require a £5 billion net tax rise. And this would still leave the public finances only just in 
balance, rather than with the 0.5% of national income (£10 billion in today’s terms) 
surplus that the Chancellor is aiming for. Rather than delivering a budget surplus in this 
parliament, under this scenario it would, perhaps, be more likely to see the fiscal 
consolidation – and, with it, the date of the expected budget surplus – pushed back. This 
would require an additional one year of austerity on the most optimistic scenario and an 
additional two years on the most pessimistic one, and would add to debt. Another 
chancellor might, of course, simply decide to live with an ongoing deficit and higher 
debt. 
 
Over the longer term, the scenarios modelled by NIESR suggest reductions in 
national income ranging from 1.8% to 7.8%. After accounting for reduced spending on 
financial contributions to the EU, these falls in national income would reduce the amount 





5. Conclusions  
 
The impact of Brexit on fiscal effect, the UK economy and wider British interests 
would be severe and felt across multiple channels. Both the path and the endpoint, in 
terms of the new relationship between the UK and the rest of the EU, would be uncertain, 
compounding the costs to the UK. 
 
The direct impact on the rest of the EU would also be significant. The export, 
supply chain, investment and policy interests of many large corporates would be 
adversely affected, but perhaps the single biggest impact will be on the cost of raising 
finance in Europe which is likely to increase. 
 
The mechanical effect of leaving the EU would be to strengthen the UK’s public 
finances by around £8 billion a year as a direct result of ending UK's net contribution to 
the EU’s budget. Future governments might well also decide to spend somewhat less than 
the current £4 billion or so of EU money that goes to support agriculture and, to a smaller 
extent, poorer regions such as Cornwall and the west of Wales. In that case, the public 
finances would be strengthened by somewhat more than £8 billion a year, though 
obviously at the expense of the farmers and regions whose subsidies would be cut. 
 
This mechanical effect would be substantially smaller if, post Brexit, a future UK 
government were to decide to join the EEA in order to gain most, though not all, of the 
benefits conferred by membership of the single market. It is hard to know quite what the 
cost of that would be, but going by the Norwegian experience it might reduce the 
budgetary benefit of Brexit by about a half, or possibly more, as we would be required to 
make a contribution to the EU budget. It would not, however, take a substantial effect on 
future national income to offset this immediate £8 billion gain to the public finances. A 
fall in national income of just 0.6% relative to what it would otherwise have been would 
be enough. There is a wide range of estimates of both the short- and long-run effects of a 
Brexit on national income. The vast majority suggest a negative effect substantially in 




In the short run, this negative effect is largely driven by an increase in uncertainty 
leading to a reduction in investment, lower consumer spending, falls in asset values and a 
hit to the exchange rate. In the longer run, more expensive trade with the EU – much 
UK's biggest trade partner – is generally modelled as the largest contributor to reduced 
national income, though a fall in foreign direct investment (FDI) could also be important. 
The scale of the long-run hit will depend on what trade arrangements we reach and the 
extent to which any reduced trade flows feed through into reduced productivity. Some 
reduction in regulation could have an offsetting effect, though most estimates are for this 
to be relatively small. In any case, such effects would depend on future political 
decisions, which are hard to forecast.  
 
In the longer term, the way to think about the public finance effects of a lower 
growth trajectory is a bit different. Assuming we want to keep public spending at around 
the same proportion of national income into the future as it is currently planned to be in 
2019–20, then one would expect public spending, on neutral assumptions, simply to 
follow the path of the economy. This, to borrow the language that Mr. Osborne used as 
shadow Chancellor prior to the financial crisis, would be one way of sharing the proceeds 
of growth between additional public spending and additional private consumption. If the 
economy, and private earnings and consumption, are bigger then in general we see that 
public spending is also bigger, and hence the quality of public services is greater. The 
reverse is true when the economy is smaller. Over the longer term, the scenarios modelled 
by NIESR suggest reductions in national income ranging from 1.8% to 7.8%. After 
accounting for reduced spending on financial contributions to the EU, these falls in 
national income would reduce the amount available to be spent publicly by between £7 
billion and £48 billion a year. 
 
Furthermore, Brexit would have a wider political impact on the EU, both by 
disrupting internal political dynamics and because of the risk of political contagion if the 
‘proof of concept’ of leaving the EU encourages disintegrative forces in other member 
states. Europe would also lose esteem and influence around the world. Member states 
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would be affected in different ways and to different extents. This will most likely 
influence ways in which states are willing to engage and accommodate the UK during the 
pre-referendum negotiation. All member states would, however, feel the impact of Brexit, 
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Annex 1 Investment rate assumptions 
 
Investment as % GDP 
Country Initial rate (2014) From 2025 
Australia 26.4% 22.4% 
Canada 21.4% 16.4% 
France 19.1% 15.1% 
Germany 20.1% 18.1% 
Italy 20.3% 18.3% 
Japan 24.8% 19.8% 
South Korea 30.9% 23.9% 
Spain 23.9% 18.9% 
United Kingdom 17.2% 16.0% 
United State 20.6% 16.0% 
Brazil 18.4% 18.4% 
China 36.3% 20.3% 
India 25.7% 23.7% 
Indonesia 26.0% 23.0% 
Mexcio 19.8% 19.8% 
Russia 17.9% 17.9% 
Turkey 21.2% 21.2% 
Argentina 16.4% 17.4% 
Bangladesh 21.2% 23.2% 
Colombia 19.2% 19.2% 
Egypt 15.5% 18.0% 
Iran 20.5% 9.5% 
Malaysia 28.2% 28.2% 
Netherlands 20.6% 20.6% 






Philippines 20.5% 25.5% 
Poland 20.0% 20% 
Saudi Arabia 20.5% 24.5% 
South Africa 17.8% 23.8% 
Thailand 29.8% 29.8% 
Vietnam 20.1% 25.1% 
 
 
Annex 2 Fiscal forecast overview 
 
  Percentage change on a year earlier, unless otherwise stated 
  Outturn Forecast 
  2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 
Gross domestic product 
(GDP) 
1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 
GDP per capita 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 
GDP levels (2016=100) 100.0 101.5 103.0 104.3 105.7 107.2 108.9 
Output gap -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
Household consumption 2.8 1.5 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 
General government 
consumption 
1.1 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.0 
Business investment -0.4 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 
General government 
investment 
1.5 2.4 1.4 2.3 6.2 1.1 0.9 
Net trade1 -0.9 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Inflation        
CPI 0.7 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Labor Market        
Employment (millions) 31.7 32.1 32.3 32.4 32.5 32.6 32.7 
Average earnings 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.1 
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LFS unemployment (rate, 
per cent) 
4.9 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.6 
  Changes since November forecast 
Output at constant 
market prices 
              
Gross domestic product  0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1  
GDP per capita -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4  -0.1 
GDP levels (2016=100) 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -1.0 -1.6 -2.1  0.0 
Output gap -0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1  0.0 
Expenditure component 
of real GDP 
      
 
Household consumption -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 
General government 
consumption 
0.2 -0.8 0.3 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 
Business investment 1.1 2.5 -1.4 -1.9 -1.4 -1.2 0.1 
General government 
investment 
0.1 2.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -2.7 0.3 
Net trade1 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Inflation        
CPI 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Labor Market        
Employment (millions) 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Average earnings 0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.1 










Annex 3 The EU Single Market: Legal and Economic Background 
 
This appendix gives fuller detail on how the EU Single Market was established and how 
it has evolved, and reviews the summaries of its economic impact.  
Origins and legal basis of the Single Market  
The concept of a ‘common market’ was central in the Treaty of Rome, which founded the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Article 3 agreed:  
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative 
restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having 
equivalent effect;   
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial policy 
towards third countries;   
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for 
persons, services and capital.  
In other words, the common market established a customs union and the free movement 
of goods, people, services and capital. These latter are now known as the Four Freedoms.   
Evolution of the Single Market  
The level of integration of the Single Market has evolved significantly over time. In the 
first decade of its operation, to 1968, the Customs Union was completed and duties 
between Member States abolished. However, this only eliminated formal trade 
restrictions. The Court of Justice of the European Union did rule on cases where 
Member-State rules restricted the Four Freedoms, but it was not until 1985 that the 
European Council received a White Paper on Completing the Internal Market (European 
Commission, 1985), which the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) 
suggests ‘essentially set the agenda for the Single Market as we know it today’. This 
White Paper was a direct response to ‘Eurosclerosis’, the perceived stagnation of 
European economies, by planning a genuine single market for Europe. In particular, it 
argued for a more active strategy based on mutual recognition and on more legislative 
harmonisation; most of these measures were adopted by 1992.   
Since the early 1990s, further efforts have been made to remove barriers to intra-EU 




The Maastricht Treaty (1993) added new EU competences in areas relevant to the Single 
Market such as consumer protection and trans-European   networks; modified other areas 
such as the environment; gave Treaty standing to the 1988 legislation that largely 
abolished controls on capital and payments transfers between Member States; and created 
the concept of European citizenship, which would turn out to have major implications for 
freedom of movement within the EU.   
Since 1996, there has been much more attention to the level of integration on services. In 
particular, as summarized by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013):  
The Financial Services Action Plan in 1999 set out a range of proposed legislation aiming 
to make it easier to market financial services across the EU; in 2005 legislation was 
agreed, consolidating the system for mutual recognition of a range of professional 
qualifications across the EU; and in 2006 the Services Directive was agreed, 
consolidating jurisprudence and making it easier for unjustified barriers to services 
provision to be abolished.  
In summary, the EU was founded with the aim of establishing a ‘common market’ with 
the ‘Four Freedoms’ of goods, services, persons and capital. Initially, efforts were focused 
on eliminating or reducing formal trade and customs barriers between members, but since 
the early 1990s, in response to sluggish economic performance, the EU has focused 
increasingly on ‘completing the Single Market’ with an emphasis on services, including 
financial services.   
Valuing the impact of the Single Market  
As part of the previous UK government’s ‘Balance of Competency’ exercise in 2012, BIS 
reviewed a number of economic assessments of the Single Market. The full review is 
available in appendix 1 of Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013); here, I 
reproduce the summary table of these studies (Table 3.1).   




Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013. 
 
Clearly, these studies cover different time periods and take a variety of approaches to 
estimating the contribution of the Single Market. Some highlight changes to the level of 
economic output achieved by the Single Market, while one suggests it would cause the 
EU growth rate to increase.   
Only one of the six studies – Minford et al. (2005) – finds a negative impact. In addition, 
it used inaccurate assumptions that exaggerated the negative impact and a modelling 
approach that ignored important features of international trade. A subsequent paper by 
CEP (2016b) has confirmed several fundamental problems with the approach. 
Among the studies that find a positive impact, there is a wide range. The three ex-post 
assessments suggest an impact of 1.3% (to 1994; Monti (1996)), 2.2% (in 2006 using the 
period 1992–2006; Ilzkovitz et al. (2007)) and 5% (in 2008 using the full period since 
1950; Boltho and Eichengreen (2008)). The ex-ante assessments suggest potentially 
higher figures, from 4.25% over the mid1990s (Cecchini, 1998), to an ongoing growth 
effect that, even over just a decade, would amount to 3–9% (Baldwin, 1989).   
In summary, amongst these studies, there is a consensus that the Single Market has had a 
positive impact on EU economic output. A figure in the region of a 5% increase to EU 
GDP, relative to a situation where a Single Market was not pursued, would not seem 
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implausible. If that were the case, the Single Market’s impact would mean an average EU 
citizen enjoys annual income and public service spending at a level 5% higher than 
otherwise. Still, I should exercise caution – several of the studies suffer from 
methodological issues that could bias the results upwards or downwards. In addition, the 
impact for individual member states could certainly differ from the EU average figure.   
Whilst these studies provide relevant context, the estimates reviewed in Chapter 5 the 
conclusion are UK specific – they take into account the characteristics of the UK 







Annex 4 EU/EFTA Trade Deals 
EU and EFTA trade deals and country coverage   
EU  only EU & EFTA EFTA only 
Europe & Central Asia 
 Kosovo 
 Faroe Islands 
 San Marino 
 Andorra 
 Turkey 










 Central American States 






























Africa & other  
 Cameroon 
 Papua New Guinea & Fiji 
 Madagascar, Mauritius, the 
Seychelles & Zimbabwe 
 





13 deals, 34 countries 
EU total 
33 deals, 57 countries 
Both-23 countries EFTA only 
7 deals, 15 countries 
EFTA total 






Annex 5 Modelling Results by Brexit Scenario 
 
This table summarizes the quantitative economic assessments of Brexit according to the 
broad scenario considered. In the main text, I only look at those that consider all three 
scenarios. A full description of these assessments and their coverage is contained in 
Emmerson et al., 2016. 
 
Scenario Organisation Estimate(% of GDP)  Range (% of GDP) 
EEA CEP(2016a)static -1.3 N/A 
HM Treasury -3.8 (-3.4 to -4.3) 
NIESR -1.8 (-1.5 to -2.1) 
    
FTA CEP(2016a)dynamic -7.9 (-6.3 to -9.5) 
HM Treasury -6.2 (-4.6 to -7.8) 
NIESR -2.1 (-1.9 to -2.3) 
PwC(2016a) -1.2 N/A 
Oxford Economics -2.0 (-0.1to -3.1) 
Open Europe -0.1 (-0.8 to +0.6) 
OECD -5.1 (-2.7 to -7.7) 
    
WTO CEP(2016a)static -2.6 N/A 
HM Treasury -7.5 (-5.4 to -9.5) 
NIESR -3.2 (-2.7 to -3.7) 
NIESR -7.8 N/A 
PwC(2016a) -3.5 N/A 
Oxford Economics -2.7 (-1.5 to -3.9) 








Annex 6 Key public finances data since 2010 in UK 
 
Year 
Total Receipts (PSCR) 
Total Receipts 
(PSCR) 
Public sector net 
borrowing (PSNB) 
Public sector net 
debt (PSND) 
Per cent of GDP 
2010-11 36.3 44.8 -8.6 71.4 
2011-12 36.7 43.7 -7.1 75.1 
2012-13 35.9 43.0 -7.1 78.6 
2013-14 35.8 41.4 -5.5 80.5 
2014-15 35.7 40.6 -4.9 82.9 
2015-16 36.0 39.8 -3.8 82.6 
2016-17 36.6 38.9 -2.3 85.3 
2017-18 36.6 38.8 -2.2 85.6 
2018-19 36.7 38.4 -1.8 85.5 
2019-20 36.8 38.3 -1.6 85.1 
2020-21 36.8 38.1 -1.3 82.1 
2021-22 36.7 37.8 -1.1 78.3 






Annex 7  
Top 10, UK international trade in services (excluding travel, transport and banking) 
exports by product, 2016 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Financial 14909 13585 14896 18415 
Services between related enterprises 11662 11407 11970 14668 
Business management and management consulting 
services 6302 7279 7249 8921 
Telecommunications 5978 7256 6783 8617 
Computer Services 6696 7739 7673 8335 
Engineering Services 7068 7031 7348 7314 
Other trade in services 5603 5654 5449 7092 
Advertising market research and public opinion 
polling services 4337 4971 5258 7085 
Charges or payments for the use of copyrights 4390 4734 5223 6459 
Provision of R&D services 5141 5086 5224 5749 
 
 
 
